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The Categorical Imperative as a 
Decarceral Agenda 
Jessica M. Eaglin† 
INTRODUCTION 
In his forthcoming book, The Insidious Momentum of Mass 
Incarceration, Frank Zimring proposes two alternative methods 
to decarcerate: states can adopt a categorical imperative to re-
duce prison populations or states can reform the governance of 
sentencing. This symposium Essay focuses on the first of these 
options, as proposed in his tentative Chapter Six, wherein Zim-
ring calls for categorically removing drug-addicted offenders 
from eligibility for prison sanctions and expanding use of jails for 
categories of offenses or offenders.1  
These methods, I suggest, exist in tension with numerous 
popular sentencing reforms being implemented in the states 
right now. Popular reforms, including the expansion of drug 
courts and the institutionalization of actuarial risk assessment 
instruments (RAIs or tools), directly or indirectly contradict the 
pragmatic, structural methods that Zimring proposes in his book 
to incentivize reductions in state prison populations. By explor-
ing the tensions between reform trends in practice and Zimring’s 
proscription, this Essay illuminates a deeper concern within sen-
tencing reform policies adopted in the era of mass incarceration. 
I argue that reforms focused on identifying categories of offend-
ers for diversion from prison sentences may undermine the call 
to decarcerate by obscuring the ways that policymakers continue 
to use the carceral state as the preferred method to respond to 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. 
Thanks to the participants and attendees at the 2019 Minnesota Law Review 
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 1. FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE INSIDIOUS MOMENTUM OF MASS INCARCERA-
TION (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript ch. 6) (on file with author). 
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sociopolitical problems in society. Recognizing this shortcoming 
upfront has important implications for scholars and policymak-
ers alike when contemplating the contours of reform agendas go-
ing forward. Practically, it requires strategic engagement with 
the broad scope of pragmatic reforms, a point that Zimring urges 
with his categorical imperative. Theoretically, it requires reflec-
tion on the methodologies implemented to shape a decarceral 
agenda more broadly. I thank the Minnesota Law Review for the 
opportunity to think about these issues as part of this timely 
symposium.  
The Essay unfolds in three Parts. Part I introduces Zim-
ring’s categorical imperative and juxtaposes it against common 
sentencing reforms in the states, including drug courts. Part II 
explains the tension between the categorical imperative and the 
institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing 
in particular. It highlights how Zimring’s suggested method and 
RAIs at sentencing invoke different meanings of “categorical” re-
form and maintain diverging capacities to raise broader critiques 
of the carceral state. Part III considers what strategic and meth-
odological insights the categorical imperative offers for sentenc-
ing reform efforts going forward.  
I.  “ACTIVE” DECARCERAL REFORMS AND ZIMRING’S 
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 
Zimring proposes a provocative decarceral sentencing re-
form agenda for the next twenty-five years: remove categories of 
offenders from prison eligibility and/or shift responsibility for 
some categories of offenders from state to local administrators.2 
These reforms generate from two radical empirical conclusions 
about historical trends in the states since 2007. First, decarcer-
ation aims should be much more modest than many reformers 
are willing to admit.3 Second, California is the only state to un-
dergo serious decarceration in the decade after the 2007 peak in 
the U.S. prison admission rate.4 Zimring encourages reformers 
to learn from California’s approach and apply it in other states.5 
Rather than aspire toward an end to mass incarceration, this in-
tervention suggests a way to sustain lower incarceration levels 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. (manuscript ch. 5). 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 
2020] THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE  2717 
 
over a longer period of time.6 This Part briefly describes the cat-
egorical imperative and situates this agenda in the context of 
recent trends in state sentencing reform efforts.  
Zimring’s “categorical imperative” approach to prison alter-
natives has two parts. First, Zimring proposes that states should 
remove categories of offenders from prison eligibility, and possi-
bly from criminal responsibility entirely.7 In particular, he fo-
cuses on drug-addicted offenders.8 As he explains, much of the 
increase in prison populations across the country can be at-
tributed to the War on Drugs in the 1980s through 1990s.9 As 
Zimring emphasizes, “[the] penal policy toward drugs [in 2006] 
is producing twice as many prison convicts, many more than 
twice as many ex-prisoners and twice as many families of pris-
oners as homicides each year.”10 Even though prison sentences 
increased for all types of offenses, reducing the occurrence of in-
carceration for this subpopulation in particular could effectively 
reduce the impact of mass incarceration.11  
Second, Zimring proposes a broader “realignment” of crimi-
nal financial incentives to reduce incarceration.12 He rightly 
identifies the “correctional free lunch” problem wherein the 
county implements criminal enforcement, but the state incurs 
the cost of incarceration.13 That is, local prosecutors and judges 
play an outsized role in determining how much punishment a 
defendant will serve and where.14 From the litany of options, 
however, prison is the cheapest for these local actors.15 The state 
pays to maintain state prisons, while counties pay for local 
jails.16 With the buildup of the carceral state, prison admissions 
increased exponentially.17 If counties, rather than jails, incur the 
brunt of the cost of enforcing sentences by redistributing punish-
ment for certain categories of offenders to jail or incarceration 
alternatives, then use of incarceration as an option will likely 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. (manuscript ch. 6). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. (manuscript ch. 3). 
 10. Id. (manuscript ch. 3 at 7–9).  
 11. Id. (manuscript ch. 6). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. (manuscript ch. 3). 
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decrease in frequency and severity, while access to families and 
resources could increase, given jails’ geographic locations com-
pared to prisons.18  
In a sense, Zimring’s call for reform aligns with a broader 
trend in criminal justice right now. Since 1989, “drug courts” 
that allow local actors to divert defendants convicted of low-level 
offenses into treatment programs as punishment rather than 
long prison sentences have grown in popularity.19 Numerous lo-
cal jurisdictions and even the federal government have adopted 
or considered expanding this reform through legislation or judi-
cial fiat in the last three decades.20 Since the 2000s, a variety of 
specialty courts have emerged and grown in popularity in the 
states as well.21 Like drug courts, these programs are meant to 
connect defendants with treatment for underlying problems like 
addiction and mental illness to more effectively respond to the 
 
 18. Id. (manuscript ch. 6). 
 19. See Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
595, 603–06 (2016) (describing the expansion of drug courts and other special-
ized courts in response to the pressures of mass incarceration). This Essay uses 
the term “diversion” in the narrow sense that it diverts defendants from long 
prison sentences. A decreasing number of specialty courts divert defendants 
from the criminal justice system entirely, without a conviction for the offense 
upon completion of the program. Because this model of specialty court is in-
creasingly rare, this Essay does not discuss the distinction in detail. See U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE-TO-INCARCERATION COURT PRO-
GRAMS 5–6 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and 
-publications/research-publications/2017/20170928_alternatives.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4QT5-8H9V]. 
 20. Eaglin, supra note 19, at 610 (noting the expansion of specialty courts 
through Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) reforms); see also U.S. SENTENC-
ING COMM’N, supra note 19, at 14–17 (describing the expansion of diversionary 
courts in the federal system through the Department of Justice “Smart on 
Crime” initiative announced in 2013); Jessica M. Eaglin, Neorehabilitation and 
Indiana’s Sentencing Reform Dilemma, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 867, 874 (2013) (dis-
cussing Indiana legislation enabling specialty courts); Allegra M. McLeod, 
Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 
GEO. L.J. 1587, 1643 n.227 (2012) (discussing Idaho legislation enabling drug 
courts). For an interesting take on the “judge-led” nature of these courts, see 
Erin R. Collins, The Problem of Problem-Solving Courts (unpublished manu-
script), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3492003. 
 21. These include domestic violence courts, mental health courts, truancy 
courts, homeless courts, veteran courts, and human trafficking intervention 
courts. See Eaglin, supra note 19, at 607–09 (collecting examples of specialty 
courts); see also Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. 1481, 1483–84 
(2017) (distinguishing between “problem-solving courts” and the development 
of “status courts” that celebrate an offender’s association with a specific charac-
teristic).  
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occurrence of crime with strategies other than severe terms of 
incarceration in prisons.22 Both drug courts and other diversion-
ary programs often rely heavily on “flash incarceration” in local 
jails as an alternative form of penal sanction.23 Whether these 
interventions actually reduce lengthy terms of incarceration, the 
combination of treatment and local incarceration appear to re-
duce reliance on prison sentences for these sympathetic subsets 
of criminal defendants.24 Additionally, several states have mod-
estly revised drug legislation for the lowest level of drug offend-
ers to encourage diversion from prison for first-time offenders.25 
Some states have expanded their legislative revisions to permit 
or encourage the diversion of low-level property offenders from 
incarceration as well.26 Thus, a trend toward diverting low-level 
offenders from prison, in particular drug offenders, is already 
 
 22. Eaglin, supra note 19, at 605–07. 
 23. See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 20, at 1621, 1624–25 (explaining how some 
specialty criminal courts like domestic violence courts and sex offense courts 
operating on a judicial monitoring model may “increase periods of at least short-
term incarceration”); Chief Justice O’Connor Cites Catastrophic Effects If State 
Issue 1 Passes This Fall, COURT NEWS OHIO (Aug. 30, 2018), http://www 
.courtnewsohio.gov/bench/2018/issueOne_083018.asp#.XffPZmXhi8U [https:// 
perma.cc/MG89-26WV] (suggesting that jail time is an important component to 
effectively running drug courts). 
 24. See, e.g., DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & AMANDA B. CISSNER, CTR. FOR CT. 
INNOVATION, SEEING EYE TO EYE?: PARTICIPANT AND STAFF PERSPECTIVES ON 
DRUG COURTS 1 (2005) (“[D]rug courts have been somewhat less successful in 
reducing incarceration time. Although those who complete the program spend 
substantially less time in prison than traditionally prosecuted cases, the rela-
tively lengthy sentences for those who do not complete, combined with pro-
grams’ use of short term incarceration as a sanction for noncompliant partici-
pant behavior, render the overall time incarcerated only slightly lower than that 
of comparable non-drug court defendants.” (internal citation omitted)); Collins, 
supra note 21, at 1485 (detailing the problem with removing sympathetic popu-
lations from conventional court systems); Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neoreha-
bilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 212–13 (2013) (critiquing neorehabilitation pro-
grams for imposing longer sentences for those who fail and for expanding net of 
people entering justice system); see also Allegra M. McLeod, Beyond the Car-
ceral State, 95 TEX. L. REV. 651, 669–70 (2017) (describing how a Texas reform 
for drug offenders and probation and parole violators reduced prison population 
numbers but expanded incarceration in “fully secured facilities . . . [that] look 
and operate like prisons” but are not counted in prison population statistics).  
 25. See, e.g., The Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act, S. 
1154, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 38, 48 (S.C. 2010); Eaglin, supra note 
19, at 607–09 (describing state reforms aimed at reducing incarceration of low-
level offenders and first-time drug offenders in particular).  
 26. Eaglin, supra note 19, at 609–11.  
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underway.27 These reforms aim to reduce the economic and so-
cial pressures of mass incarceration by making a bloated system 
more efficient—that is, by reducing recidivism, increasing public 
safety, and saving states’ money.28  
But in an important respect, Zimring’s intervention is at 
odds with these popular criminal justice reforms in the states. 
Whereas Zimring suggests diversion as a low discretionary ac-
tion for local actors, the larger movement to shift defendants to 
decarceral alternatives is highly discretionary for local actors.29 
That is, local actors currently choose which defendants to divert 
from the traditional, punitive sentencing apparatus that legisla-
tures leave largely intact.30 For example, drug courts and other 
specialty courts have developed alongside the creation of increas-
ingly punitive sentencing laws.31 While state legislatures or ju-
dicial counsels may impose stringent eligibility requirements for 
entry into these diversionary programs,32 layered on top of those 
eligibility requirements is a significant amount of discretion al-
located to local actors like prosecutors, public defenders, and 
 
 27. See generally id. (exploring the broader effects of the drug court move-
ment aimed at managing overflowing prison populations). 
 28. Eaglin, supra note 24, at 192; Eaglin, supra note 19, at 605–07.  
 29. This Essay uses the term “discretion” in line with Kevin Reitz’s defini-
tion of “sentencing discretion,” which “exists whenever a participant in the de-
sign or operation of the criminal justice system can exercise choice in a way that 
dictates, places limits upon, or contributes to the sentencing outcome of a par-
ticular criminal case or whole categories of cases.” Kevin R. Reitz, Modeling 
Discretion in American Sentencing Systems, 20 LAW & POL’Y 389, 391 (1998). 
Importantly, this definition of sentencing discretion “does not emphasize a dis-
tinction between the promulgation of a ‘rule’ and an act of ‘discretion,’ so long 
as either form of decision-making exerts influence over the punishment outcome 
of at least one case.” Id. at 391–92.  
 30. Thus, this Essay is mostly concerned with a subset of what Reitz refers 
to as “disabling sentencing discretion.” See id. at 394. That is, it concerns the 
choices that have the effect of eliminating case outcomes from possible prison 
sentences, even if it does not eliminate the cases from the criminal justice sys-
tem writ large. See id. (emphasizing that disabling discretion concerns elimi-
nate cases from the criminal justice system).  
 31. See Eaglin, supra note 19, at 635.  
 32. See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False 
Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1490–91 (2004) 
(stating that based on National Association of Drug Court Professionals guide-
lines, most states and Congress mandate eligibility requirements for entry to a 
drug court program); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE AS-
SISTANCE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS (1997), https:// 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/205621.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE48-VHWF]. 
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judges.33 These local actors select which defendants can enter 
diversionary programs even if, on their face, such defendants 
would qualify for diversion from sentences to incarceration.34 
Thus, the expansion of diversionary programs at the state level 
gives local actors the option to use their discretionary power to 
further decarceral ends.35 Nowhere in the current structure of 
reform is there an imperative to do so.36  
Contrary to recent reforms, Zimring’s categorical imperative 
demands flipping the structure of current efforts from high to 
low discretion for local actors. Specifically, Zimring urges reduc-
ing local prosecutors’ ability to choose which defendants should 
be diverted from prison on an individual basis.37 Rather, he sug-
gests categorical exclusion for a broader category of people as de-
fined by the state legislature.38 Zimring draws this conclusion 
from the experience in California.39 In response to federal court 
orders for the state to reduce its prison population in order to 
offer adequate medical and mental health care in state prisons,40 
state legislators passed and local actors implemented the Public 
Safety Realignment Act in 2011.41 This legislation shifted re-
sponsibility to punish and supervise non-serious, non-violent, 
 
 33. Eaglin, supra note 19, at 604–05. 
 34. GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROB-
LEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 86 (2005) (explaining how traditional adversaries like 
prosecutors and defenders “work[ ] together to design guidelines, eligibility cri-
teria, and sanctioning schemes [in drug courts]”); Josh Bowers, Contraindicated 
Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 798 (2008) (asserting that local prosecutors 
decide whether defendants have access to drug court treatment programs); Col-
lins, supra note 21, at 1504–05 (explaining that veterans courts exclude those 
who are dishonorably discharged); Eaglin, supra note 24, at 211 (discussing the 
disconnect between empirical studies of risk and those entering treatment pro-
grams generally). 
 35. For example, Allegra McLeod describes what a decarceral model of spe-
cialty courts would look like if local actors chose to pursue that route. See 
McLeod, supra note 20, at 1630. Whether states “give” or judges “take” discre-
tion to create these alternative treatment programs is unclear. See Collins, su-
pra note 21. It matters little, however, since most legislation encourages judges 
to continue developing courts as part of an agenda to reduce prison populations 
and corrections costs. See id. at 30; see also Eaglin, supra note 19, at 604–06. 
 36. See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 20. 
 37. Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6). 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. (manuscript ch. 5). 
 40. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) declined to extend by Irvin v. 
Thomas, No. 7:14-cv-00660-MMH-JEO, 2016 WL 4247880 (N.D. Ala. 2016). 
 41. Assemb. B. 109, 2011–2012 Sess., (Cal. 2011). 
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and non-sex offenders (with no history of serious convictions) 
from the state to the county of conviction.42 In California, where 
every person released from state prison was subject to at least 
three years of supervised parole, this reform had the effect of re-
ducing those going to prison and those returning to prison for 
“technical parole violations” that did not amount to a new 
crime.43  
California’s legislation makes diversion from prison a low 
discretionary action for local actors. It does not eliminate local 
discretion entirely. Each of the state’s fifty-eight counties de-
cides how to deal with this subset of offenders, including those 
whose parole has been revoked.44 Predictably, some counties 
have expanded the use of jails, though because jail sentences 
tend to be shorter than prison sentences, this does not neces-
sarily undermine a larger decarceral agenda.45 In addition to ex-
panding the use of jail, most counties provide local actors with a 
variety of alternative sanctions like drug courts, community ser-
vice, and electronic or GPS monitoring to address the occurrence 
of crime.46 Incarceration in prison, however, is not an option for 
these “non-non-non” offenders.47 Californians expanded this 
model with the passage of Proposition 47, an aggressive ballot 
initiative that passed in 2014.48 The Proposition reclassified 
some “wobblers,” meaning offenses that local prosecutors could 
charge as misdemeanors (limiting punishment to jail time) or 
 
 42. Id.; see Eaglin, supra note 19, at 614–15 (describing AB 109).  
 43. For more on the significance of this shift, see MARIE GOTTSCHALK, 
CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 103–
04 (2015).  
 44. Eaglin, supra note 19, at 615. 
 45. Compare Anat Rubin, California’s Jail-Building Boom, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (July 2, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/02/ 
california-s-jail-building-boom [https://perma.cc/8BLD-8KTN] (asserting that 
the shift to county jail has not meaningfully decreased incarceration), with MAG-
NUS LOFSTROM & BRANDON MARTIN, PUBLIC POL’Y INST. OF CA, PUBLIC SAFETY 
REALIGNMENT: IMPACTS SO FAR (2015), https://www.ppic.org/publication/public 
-safety-realignment-impacts-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/A7TD-M29A] (finding 
that realignment “significantly reduced the prison population”).  
 46. Eaglin, supra note 19, at 615.  
 47. Id. at 618. 
 48. Matt Ford, Californians Vote To Weaken Mass Incarceration, ATLANTIC 
(Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/11/California 
-prop-47-mass-incarceration/382372/ [https://perma.cc/MW98-8KFN]. 
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felonies (allowing defendants to face prison time) to misdemean-
ors exclusively.49 The Proposition thus forced local actors to use 
alternative measures than prison when sentencing defendants 
convicted of petty theft and drug possession.50 Again, it did not 
eliminate local discretion, but the Proposition did reduce it by 
eliminating certain carceral options for local criminal adminis-
trators.51  
Zimring’s manuscript avoids discussing specific reforms in 
detail, instead focusing on their structural design. This struc-
tural design, however, is critical to a decarceral agenda. The cat-
egorical imperative as a decarceral method avoids allowing the 
same people to make the same decisions all over again.52 Like in 
California, other state-level legislative commands would reduce 
local prosecutors’ ability to selectively pick among individual of-
fenders when considering non-prison sanctions. Thus, the 
method demands proactively identifying “categories” of offend-
ers for diversion and shifting that disabling discretion from local 
to state actors.53 Zimring suggests that this categorical impera-
tive is a promising route to realistic and meaningful decarcera-
tion.54 With it, the United States may move from “mass incarcer-
ation” to “mass incarceration light.”55 While states will not 
return to the incarceration levels of the 1970s, they may move 
toward a significant reduction in the rate of incarceration to a 
level similar to that of the 1990s.56 
 
 49. HON. RICHARD COUZENS & JUDICIAL COUNCIL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SER-
VICES STAFF, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 4–5 (2015), https://www.courts 
.ca.gov/documents/Prop47FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM3T-ZBZ8] (identifying 
revised offenses which were formerly wobblers). 
 50. Id. at 1 (asserting that Proposition 47 intended to limit prison spending 
to “violent and serious offenses” rather than crimes reclassified as misdemean-
ors). 
 51. See Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and Its Impact on 
Local Criminal Justice Systems, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 335 (2014) (noting 
that Realignment is “[b]uilt upon the principle of increased local control”). 
 52. See Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6 at 27–28) (explaining that 
the categorical imperative is different from “encouraging the same persons and 
levels of government to choose non-prison alternatives”).  
 53. See supra note 30 (defining “disabling” discretion).  
 54. Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6). 
 55. See id. (manuscript ch. 5 at 23) (“California may be close to a new sta-
bility in rates of secure confinement. If so, the scale of California’s best in the 
nation for a big state performance still predicts a long-term level of confinement 
that would retain two-thirds of the increases in rate that happened after 1970, 
perhaps a transition from ‘mass incarceration’ to ‘mass incarceration light’?”). 
 56. Id.  
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II.  THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE VERSUS RAIs? 
Perhaps because Zimring avoids engaging with specific re-
forms proliferating in the states, he does not reference the intro-
duction of RAIs as sentencing reform.57 This Part suggests his 
categorical imperative method exists in tension with this popu-
lar sentencing reform as well. After introducing this reform in 
more detail, the remainder of this Part explains its tensions with 
Zimring’s proscription to illuminate how the search for a cate-
gory of offenders suitable for diversion from prison sentences 
may be an incomplete method to address mass incarceration.  
RAIs are meant to standardize assessments of an individual 
defendant’s future risk of recidivating based on statistical anal-
yses of data collected about prior offenders’ past behavior.58 Most 
tools predict future behavior based on predetermined, objective 
factors that are empirically correlated with the occurrence of re-
cidivism, like criminal history, age, gender, employment history, 
and education.59 The tools rank defendants and divide them into 
categories of offenders based on the statistical likelihood that 
people sharing such characteristics will engage in specified be-
havior again in the future.60 Thus, a tool will classify a defendant 
as low, medium, or high risk.61  
Introduction of the tools is a popular, but controversial, in-
tervention proliferating in the states as sentencing reform.62 Ad-
vocates suggest that tools will improve decision making by intro-
ducing consistent, objective information that could encourage 
courts to issue less punitive or perhaps alternative sanctions 
other than prison for low-risk offenders.63 As the American Law 
Institute recently suggested, RAIs further improve the admin-
istration of criminal sentencing more broadly by avoiding victim-
 
 57. See generally id. (manuscript Pt. II). 
 58. Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 68–
70 (2017) (describing RAIs and the stakeholders currently developing the tools 
used at sentencing).  
 59. Id. at 79.  
 60. Id. at 85.  
 61. Id. at 87.  
 62. Claire Botnick, Evidence-Based Practice and Sentencing in State 
Courts: A Critique of the Missouri System, WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 159, 174 (2015) 
(noting the increasing popularity in “the use of risk assessments in sentencing” 
within the United States). 
 63. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(3) cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
2017) (urging sentencing courts to use RAIs to identify low risk defendants for 
sentencing to alternative sanctions other than a prison term). 
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ization of other, unidentified potential victims because it encour-
ages more supervision of high-risk defendants.64 Moreover, ad-
vocates suggest this information could shape decision making in 
ways that save money for the state by reducing incarceration 
without increasing crime.65  
Critics oppose actuarial risk assessments as sentencing re-
form for a variety of reasons as well. Because tools rely on data 
collected in the era of mass incarceration, predictions of future 
behavior replicate problematic enforcement realities about the 
carceral state.66 Tools often predict rearrest and use arrest as a 
predictive factor.67 The history of arrest practices disproportion-
ately affects the poor and minorities, or, as Zimring may say, 
“the usual suspects.”68 Thus, the tools may be overinclusive in 
identifying people who would not recidivate and underinclusive 
in identifying those who would.69 Most importantly, using the 
tools threatens to replicate structural problems in criminal law 
enforcement while eroding normative limits on punishment 
practices. This includes its potential to exacerbate racial dispar-
ities,70 punishing individuals for future behavior that has not yet 
 
 64. Id. at cmt. e (arguing that declining to use accurate RAIs results in pre-
ventable victimization).  
 65. Id. at cmt. d (“If used as a tool to encourage sentencing judges to divert 
low-risk offenders from prisons to community sanctions, risk assessments con-
serve scarce prison resources for the most dangerous offenders, reduce the over-
all costs of the corrections system, and avoid the human costs of unneeded con-
finement to offenders, offenders’ families, and communities.”). 
 66. See Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 91–93, 105–06 
(2018) (explaining how using RAIs at sentencing may lead to more, not less, 
incarceration while exacerbating existing flaws in the criminal justice system). 
 67. See Eaglin, supra note 58, at 82.  
 68. See id. at 94–96; see also Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6 at 20). 
 69. E.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal 
-sentencing [https://perma.cc/9T4W-7LLF] (finding that an actuarial risk as-
sessment used in Florida was “particularly likely to falsely flag black defend-
ants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the 
rate as white defendants”). For insight to different ways to understand this 
study, see Eaglin, supra note 58, at 96–99. See generally Sandra G. Mayson, 
Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019).  
 70. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of 
Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237 (2015) (arguing that using actuarial 
risk assessment tools may exacerbate existing racial disparities in the criminal 
justice system).  
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occurred or characteristics for which individuals are not respon-
sible,71 and possibly increasing incarceration for some defend-
ants rather than decreasing it.72 Despite these critiques from 
policymakers and scholars alike, tools continue to proliferate.73  
Though Zimring does not reference these tools directly as a 
possible sentencing reform, there are many ways that the tools 
can be and already are used in contexts that he suggests. For 
example, RAIs have been a popular tool for local administrators 
in California to use post-Realignment.74 Many local administra-
tors running drug courts and other diversionary treatment pro-
grams use RAIs as a gateway to select defendants for enroll-
ment.75 Nevertheless, expanding the use of RAIs at sentencing 
 
 71. See, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 671, 
675 (2015) (asserting that RAIs “premise punishment on . . . characteristics 
which the individual possesses by accident of birth or cannot otherwise mean-
ingfully change”).  
 72. See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Ra-
tionalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 837 (2014) (suggesting 
that RAIs may encourage judges to reduce incarceration for some offenders 
while increasing it for others).  
 73. Botnick, supra note 62, at 173–77. 
 74. See Collins, supra note 66, at 71–72 (explaining how California courts 
use actuarial risk assessments in the post-conviction sentencing context after 
Realignment); see also HEATHER M. HARRIS ET AL., PUBLIC POL’Y INST. OF CAL., 
PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN CALIFORNIA 4–5 (2019), https://www.ppic.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/pretrial-risk-assessment-in-california.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/V9JK-9BRB] (explaining how, as part of judicial reform and in response to 
the pressures of Realignment, California counties expanded use of RAIs in pre-
trial bail determinations). Zimring focuses on bail reform to a limited extent 
because that is the origin of most defendants in jails, however this Essay limits 
its critique of actuarial risk tools to “sentencing” in the post-conviction context. 
For interesting critiques of actuarial risk assessments in the bail context, see, 
for example, Lauryn Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 683–
84 (2018), which describes current RAIs as being ineffective in measuring vari-
ous risks concerning a defendant’s failure to appear for trial, and Sandra G. 
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490 (2018), which questions the 
theoretical basis for singling out defendants as subjects of RAI before adjudica-
tion.  
 75. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF., ADULT DRUG COURT BEST 
PRACTICE STANDARDS 5 (2018), https://www.nadcp.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/12/Adult-Drug-Court-Best-Practice-Standards-Volume-I-Text-Revision- 
December-2018-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D56D-U5BK] (recommending that can-
didates for a drug court are “assessed for eligibility using validated risk-assess-
ment and clinical-assessment tools”); Eaglin, supra note 24, at 216–17 (discuss-
ing the shortcomings in using actuarial risk assessments as a “barrier to entry 
into rehabilitative programming” like drug courts).  
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may conflict with the thrust of Zimring’s decarceral agenda. The 
remainder of this Part explains the tensions. 
A. DEFINING “CATEGORICAL” 
Zimring calls for categorizing offenders, and RAIs do put de-
fendants into categories. However, these are different uses of the 
idea of “categories.” Zimring’s call for categories suggests remov-
ing an entire class of events—like prison eligibility—from pros-
ecutorial discretion once inclusion in the category is deter-
mined.76 This is the logic underlying Public Safety Realignment, 
but more expressly underlying Proposition 47. By reclassifying 
several low-level, nonviolent offenses as misdemeanors, the 
Proposition prevents prosecutors from selecting to charge the of-
fenses as felonies based on the specifics of the case.77 Instead, it 
requires that all charges for these specific offenses cannot be 
treated as felonies unless the offender had a prior conviction for 
certain enumerated serious offenses.78 Thus, the Proposition 
made counties responsible for broader categories of offenders’ 
punishment as defined at the state level.79  
That “categorical” reform is not the same as using a tool that 
selects individual defendants for different sentences based on 
administrative categories of recidivism risk. Actuarial risk as-
sessments identify individual defendants who, because of their 
similarities to others in the criminal system, are not likely to be 
identified for criminal behavior in the future.80 It places defend-
 
 76. See Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6 at 2) (defining categorical 
reform efforts as “attempts to replace frequent uses of prison sentences with use 
of non-imprisonment alternatives for an entire category of offenses or offend-
ers”). 
 77. CAL. PENAL. CODE § 17 (West 2018) (distinguishing sentencing for felo-
nies and misdemeanors). 
 78. Eaglin, supra note 19, at 618.  
 79. Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6). 
 80. See Brandon Garrett & John Monahan, Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk 
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ants into “categories” based on recidivism risk to improve judi-
cial decision making.81 These categories cut across different of-
fenses.82 For example, defendants convicted of homicide would 
often be characterized as low risk of recidivism because such de-
fendants rarely find themselves in the specific situations that 
lead to that kind of violence twice.83 Oppositely, a defendant con-
victed of a drug crime may have a high risk of recidivating be-
cause addiction underlies their drive to commit crime.84 The risk 
measure cuts across different criminal outcomes as well.85 For 
example, a defendant may be at a high risk of being rearrested 
but a low risk of being reconvicted for a crime.86 Reforms based 
on this technical, managerial tool create new categories inde-
pendent from traditional criminal justice indicators like criminal 
history and criminal offense.  
On the one hand, reforms that embrace actuarial risk as-
sessment categories appear more progressive than Zimring’s 
proposal because any defendant may fit into the category of “low 
risk.” Zimring’s categorical imperative, while somewhat agnostic 
to the definition of a category, resigns to the possibility that only 
some kinds of sympathetic offenders will be affected by his ap-
proach.87 California, for its part, implemented Realignment for 
only the “non-non-nons”—non-violent, non-serious, non-sex of-
fenders.88 Conversely, RAIs create categories that have the po-
tential to reach a far less sympathetic group of offenders. For 
example, actuarial risk assessments could play an important 
 
 81. See In Brief: Understanding Risk and Needs Assessment, COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR. (Jan. 13, 2017), https://csgjusticecenter.org/jr/in 
-brief-understanding-risk-and-needs-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/DS8V 
-LFDS]. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See Eaglin, supra note 20, at 211–12.  
 84. Bowers, supra note 34, at 805–06; Eaglin, supra note 20, at 201.  
 85. See Garrett & Monahan, supra note 80. 
 86. Most often, the tools predict rearrest for any offense, but they can pre-
dict other outcomes like reconviction or rearrest for a violent crime as well. See 
Eaglin, supra note 58, at 75–76 (describing various recidivism measures in 
RAIs). Recent tools measure responsivity to rehabilitative interventions as well. 
See Jessica M. Eaglin, Technologically Distorted Conceptions of Punishment, 97 
WASH. U. L. REV. 483, 498 (2019) (explaining the significance of evolving meas-
urements of recidivism risk for sentencing).  
 87. See Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6). 
 88. See Petersilia, supra note 51, at 336 (explaining who qualifies as a “non-
non-non” offender under California’s Public Safety Realignment legislation). 
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role in providing assurances for the release of individuals con-
victed of violent and sexual offenses on parole.89 By expanding 
RAIs to sentencing determinations more broadly, perhaps RAIs 
present the kind of “categorical” reform that could have a 
broader impact on the prison population.90  
Yet that presumption elides a deeper distinction implicit 
within Zimring’s notion of a categorical imperative. Zimring uses 
“categorical” as a means to reach structural change in the ad-
ministration of criminal law by removing a broad class of people 
from prison eligibility. RAIs invoke “categorical” as a means to 
shape individual decision making by identifying narrow subsec-
tions of the existing offender population that should not be in-
carcerated independent of what brings them to the criminal jus-
tice system now. This RAI categorization invites cherry-picking 
based on the discretion of individual actors. As Zimring well de-
scribes in the book, there are structural reasons why individual 
 
 89. Numerous states have incorporated actuarial risk assessments into 
their parole processes. See, e.g., Kimberly Thomas & Paul Reingold, From Grace 
to Grids: Rethinking Due Process Protections for Parole, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 213, 245 n.201–05 (2017) (describing a trend toward increasing use of 
actuarial risk assessments in parole determinations within the states). As sev-
eral scholars have noted, “[a]n optimist might hope that discretionary prison 
release will be a critical tool in the nation’s ‘decarceration’ agenda in coming 
decades.” Edward Rhine et al., The Future of Parole Release, 46 CRIME & JUST. 
279, 280 (2017). If so, such scholars suggest that use of actuarial risk assess-
ments will be central to that prison release agenda. See id. at 283, 297–301; see 
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 9.08 reporters’ note a (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (“If we’re 
interested in undoing mass incarceration without a surge in crime, we’ll have 
to use risk-assessment technology.” (citing Jennifer Skeem, Statement at the 
Joint Meeting of Parole Advisory Council & Probation Advisory Bd., Robina 
Inst. of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice, Minneapolis, Minn. (May 11, 2017))).  
 90. Partly, this reduces to an empirical question that Zimring takes up in 
the first part of his book—what drives mass incarceration and, in turn, what 
categories of defendants could drive decarceration. See Zimring, supra note 1 
(manuscript ch. 6) (explaining the decision to focus on drug offenders). Others 
would suggest that focusing on drug offenders is in error as the volume of pris-
oners entering for violent crimes rose as well. See JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING 
UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 220–22 (2017) (urg-
ing inclusion of more than just drug offenders in criminal justice reform initia-
tives as a normative matter); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF 
MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 185 (2017) (urging 
inclusion of more than just drug offenders in criminal justice reform initiatives 
as an empirical matter). For a summary of the debate amongst policymakers 
rather than scholars, see Jamiles Lartey, Can We Fix Mass Incarceration With-
out Including Violent Offenders?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 12, 2019), https:// 
www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/12/can-we-fix-mass-incarceration 
-without-including-violent-offenders [https://perma.cc/7EPP-E9XA].  
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local actors will adhere to “business as usual.”91 Critically, struc-
tural change circumvents resistance from local administrators 
by reducing their discretion to select among individual offenders 
for lesser sentences.92 That is, the structural nature of categori-
cal reforms is imperative when shifting away from incarceration.  
RAIs, even if implemented to encourage diversion, support 
a “business-as-usual” approach to reform. Because the structure 
of incentives remains the same, introducing these tools as a sen-
tencing reform lacks the necessarily strong push for a downward 
tendency in incarceration overall. Perhaps such a reform will 
produce a redistribution of prisoners, but it may do so without 
the significant reduction in prison sentences over the long 
term.93 That business-as-usual approach is not likely to work as 
a decarceral agenda. Empirically, Zimring demonstrates this in 
his analysis of other states’ trends in prison admissions and total 
prison populations since 2007 in comparison to California.94 In 
this same time period, RAIs as sentencing reform have expanded 
greatly.95 This suggests that categorization for the sake of cate-
gorization—as RAIs do—without the structural design compo-
nent inherent to Zimring’s approach may not further a decar-
ceral agenda. 
B. CRITIQUING THE CARCERAL STATE 
Let us assume, for a moment, that actuarial tools were im-
plemented in a way that reduced local actors’ discretion and 
mandated diversion from prison for low-risk offenders.96 Even 
 
 91. See Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 5 at 6–7). 
 92. See id. (manuscript ch. 6) (explaining that the categorical imperative is 
different from “encouraging the same persons and levels of government to 
choose non-prison alternatives”).  
 93. See Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assess-
ment in the Hands of Humans (Nov. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3489440 (demonstrating how the 
introduction of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing in Virginia shifted 
prison population but incarceration rate remains high). 
 94. See Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6) (describing state trends as 
reflecting a business-as-usual approach to reform). 
 95. See Eaglin, supra note 86, at 484. This is not a causal point, but rather 
adds to the earlier observation in Part I that RAIs are not significantly different 
from other popular reforms to trigger a significant downturn in incarceration 
levels.  
 96. Scholars and policymakers have encouraged this approach. The Amer-
ican Law Institute suggests restraint to this kind of use. MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING § 9.08 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017). In a recent 
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then, RAIs as reform would exist in tension with the categorical 
imperative as a modest decarceral method. This is so because 
Zimring’s categorical imperative sustains a critique of the car-
ceral state; the proliferation of RAIs at sentencing does not.  
Like other reforms that encourage selectivity by local ad-
ministrators, RAIs encourage a kind of profiling of the offender 
pool for those deemed most appropriate for diversion.97 Profiling 
in the carceral state has an inherent limit in efficacy, even if 
used for benevolent purposes. Here is the problem: certain peo-
ple are “visible” in the data and others are not, given the existing 
enforcement practices upon which actuarial tools rely to profile 
defendants. If enforcement resources are directed toward a cer-
tain geographic and socioeconomic area, it creates more oppor-
tunity for a subpopulation in another geographic and socioeco-
nomic area to increase criminal activity with impunity.98 It 
produces what Bernard Harcourt has referred to as a potential 
“ratchet effect.”99 The concern is this: the prison population may 
stop reflecting the distribution of criminal behavior in society be-
cause resources remain focused on a particular subpopulation 
that is “predictable.”100 At the same time, crime may proliferate 
in different subpopulations because it is undetected.101  
Zimring’s critique of current drug policy and practice actu-
ally supports this concern. Zimring makes much of the opioid cri-
sis as a reason for adopting the categorical imperative at sen-
tencing. This crisis, he suggests, evidences larger shortcomings 
in criminal enforcement. As he notes, “[t]he volume of opioid 
 
article, Brandon Garrett and John Monahan encourage possible procedural lim-
its to ensure this kind of use. Brandon Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 
108 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 42). For discussion of pro-
cedural constraints on RAIs more broadly, see Jessica M. Eaglin, Beyond Equal-
ity: Procedural Constraints on Actuarial Risk Assessments at Sentencing, 105 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3190403.  
 97. See Eaglin, supra note 24, at 202 (critiquing reforms like RAIs and drug 
courts that encourage selectivity); Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal 
Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 633–34 (2012) (celebrat-
ing the selectivity of reforms that profile defendants for diversion).  
 98. For a much more detailed explanation of this idea, see BERNARD E. HAR-
COURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN AC-
TUARIAL AGE 168–69 (2007).  
 99. See id. at 160–67.  
 100. Id. at 168–69. 
 101. Id. at 156–57 (emphasizing that the “distortive effect” occurs “whenever 
law enforcement relies on the evidence of correctional traces—arrests or convic-
tions—in order to reallocate future law enforcement resources”).  
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deaths per 100,000 expands tenfold in New Hampshire and 
twentyfold in Ohio and West Virginia” between 1999 and 2016, 
but this “spectacular expansion . . . produces no strong evidence 
of impact in the average to below average concentration of drug 
offenders in state prisons in the three epidemic states.”102 Note 
the metrics that Zimring uses to assess the opioid crisis: death 
from overdose. He does not use typical risk factors like age, gen-
der, and criminal history because this epidemic touches an en-
tirely different subset of the population. Those addicted to pain-
killers that turn to opioids and heroin tend to come from middle 
America, are white, and are older than typical criminal defend-
ants.103 Thus, traditional criminal justice data is not responsive 
to the crisis because it affects a different sector of the population 
not often swept up in the carceral state. Where the harm is, the 
criminal legal apparatus is not.  
One way to resolve this dilemma is to expand the capacity 
of the carceral state to incapacitate more people so as to capture 
those not already in its net. Indeed, this is exactly how most re-
forms designed in the fashion of drug courts operate.104 But Zim-
ring does not suggest pursuing this route. Rather, he identifies 
the problem of opioid users as one of structure and perception: 
“The only major avoidable error of the criminal drug enforce-
ment leadership has been its failure to loudly proclaim its irrel-
evance to effective harm reduction programs to counter the cur-
rent epidemic.”105 Said differently, the only “failure of 
government” on this front is its refusal to acknowledge that crim-
inal law is incapable of reigning in this public health crisis.106 
For Zimring, illuminating this shortcoming has long-term ex-
pressive potential. If criminal law enforcement cannot handle 
one kind of drug addiction problem, perhaps it is not qualified to 
handle others. At the very least, it begs restructuring criminal 
law enforcement of drugs at the center of the first War on Drugs 
(crack cocaine) so that, for drug-addicted offenders, the preferred 
form of punishment is treatment and possibly decriminaliza-
tion.107 As Zimring suggests, applying this categorical method of 
reform in other states and in the federal system could remove 
 
 102. See Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6 at 16 fig.6.4).  
 103. Id.  
 104. See Eaglin, supra note 19, at 631–34 (noting limits to efficiency argu-
ments as the basis of sentencing reforms like those modeled after drug courts).  
 105. See Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6 at 17).  
 106. Id. (manuscript ch. 6).  
 107. Id.  
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100,000 prisoners from the total population if the reform in-
cludes not just opioid users, but “street drug abusers” as well.108  
This is a structural critique of the carceral state. That is, it 
suggests that expanding the carceral arm of government to cope 
with another social problem is simply not an effective response. 
Rather than increasing drug enforcement resources or enhanc-
ing punitive sentencing practices for opioid users, Zimring’s 
decarceral method implicitly identifies a limit to carceral expan-
sion. Structural transformations can improve current practices. 
In part, this requires removing criminal regulation as a primary 
response to emerging social crises. The other option—to expand 
resources and enhance punitive practices—would contradict the 
method’s higher calling to decarcerate. In this sense, the method 
diverges from the trend in reforms toward managing more sym-
pathetic defendants without using prisons while persistently 
framing social issues as carceral state problems.109 It opens 
space to question how society chooses to respond to social crises. 
It maintains decarceration as the guidepost to reform, not treat-
ment or profiling or some other interest.110 In so framing the 
method, it offers a potential basis for contraction of the carceral 
state.  
RAIs do not sustain structural critiques of the carceral state. 
To be sure, they sustain critiques of punishment practices. For 
example, these tools may demonstrate that some people are be-
ing incarcerated for too long without a very good reason.111 They 
may be used to suggest that local administrators are not using 
alternatives to incarceration to the full extent possible.112 They 
may even be used to suggest that incarceration is not the best 
 
 108. Id.  
 109. To the contrary, local actors are developing diversionary treatment pro-
grams similar to drug courts to capture more social issues. See, e.g., Aya Gruber 
et al., Penal Welfare and the New Human Trafficking Intervention Courts, 68 
FLA. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2016) (describing creation of human trafficking inter-
vention courts); Collins, supra note 20, at 12–13 (describing development of opi-
oid intervention courts).  
 110. See Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6) (warning that the alterna-
tive to abandoning prison as a policy priority would be the radical increase in 
the flow of new drug prisoners).  
 111. See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HOW MANY 
AMERICANS ARE UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 7–10 (2016) (urging reevalu-
ating sentences based on science of risk and rehabilitation).  
 112. See, e.g., Garrett & Monahan, supra note 80, at 7–25 (examining how 
courts use risk information in local decision making).  
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response for punishment.113 But they do not suggest that the car-
ceral state is too expansive or so deeply flawed that a cursory 
redistribution of punishment cannot satisfy the concerns raised 
by mass incarceration critiques most broadly defined.114 This is 
part of their appeal as a sentencing reform.115 To the extent that 
Zimring’s proscription opens the door to the possibility that the 
criminal apparatus is not the right place to deal with a particular 
social problem, the expansion of RAIs as a sentencing reform ex-
ists in tension with that method. Thus, proliferation of the tools 
could frustrate a larger decarceral agenda.  
III.  REFLECTIONS ON A DICHOTOMOUS DECARCERAL 
AGENDA 
The above exploration of the tensions between Zimring’s 
proscription and popular sentencing reforms highlights a deeper 
tension within the reform policies being adopted in response to 
the economic and social pressures of mass incarceration. 
Whereas current popular interventions like specialty courts and 
actuarial risk assessments resist placing reduction in the use of 
incarceration as the central aim of reform, Zimring’s structural 
method encourages states to place decarceration as a primary 
aim and incentivize local actors to accord with this aim through 
categorization.116 At the same time, the above discussion illumi-
nates how Zimring’s proscription remains incomplete as a decar-
ceral agenda because it only implicitly confronts a fuller scope of 
intersecting shortcomings persistent in current sentencing re-
forms. Where sentencing reforms may focus on categorization as 
a means to achieve other aims like efficiency and cost-savings, 
they can also sustain policymakers’ tendency to frame social is-
sues as matters of crime and punishment.117 It is the combina-
tion of these features in sentencing reforms—the resistance to 
 
 113. See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text (discussing RAIs as an 
indicator for diversion to treatment programs within the carceral state).  
 114. See Eaglin, supra note 86, at 543 (noting the “fundamental tension be-
tween the rise of actuarial risk tools at sentencing and the broader effort to 
dismantle the sociohistorical phenomenon of mass incarceration in the United 
States”).  
 115. See id. at 535 (analyzing the appeal of actuarial risk assessments in 
relation to the shift toward neorehabilitative reforms).  
 116. Compare supra notes 19–28 (describing current reforms tendency to fo-
cus on efficiency and cost), with supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text 
(framing Zimring’s proscription as a structural critique of the carceral state). 
 117. See supra Part II.B; see also, Eaglin, supra note 19, at 631–34 (discuss-
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thinking beyond the carceral state, the instance on searching for 
the “right” categorization of people as subjects for reform in the 
criminal justice system, and the overarching emphasis on effi-
ciency and costs rather than decarceration—that threatens to 
expand the carceral state in the long run even if reforms stabilize 
or modestly decrease state prison populations in the short term. 
Because Zimring’s proscription only implicitly recognizes the in-
tersection of these three features, it offers valuable insights but 
not a cohesive path forward for scholars and policymakers inter-
ested in decarceration.  
This Essay concludes by highlighting three takeaways for 
those thinking about how to approach sentencing reforms with a 
decarceral agenda in mind. Though not the central takeaways of 
Zimring’s methodological proscription, it draws upon features of 
his categorical imperative to highlight useful practical and the-
oretical insights.  
First, look to the intersections. The promise of Zimring’s cat-
egorical imperative exists at the intersection of different crimi-
nal justice reforms that together created conditions to achieve 
decarceral aims. Would shifting the categories of offenders eligi-
ble for prison sentence or increasing local criminal justice actors’ 
reliance on jails, alone, be sufficient to move toward decarcera-
tion? Probably not. Despite some ambiguity in his current man-
uscript, I want to suggest that Zimring sets forth only one op-
tion—California’s experience teaches that these methods in 
tandem can produce a significant decarceral effect. Public Safety 
Realignment allowed counties to use actuarial risk assessments 
to shape sentencing practices from the beginning, and many em-
braced the tools as a means to shape judicial discretion.118 It is 
notable, then, that the reform did not really “work” by Zimring’s 
standards until after Proposition 47 went into effect.119 That is, 
significant decarceration of prison and jail populations did not 
start until after Proposition 47 went into effect in 2014. As Zim-
ring notes, from 2011 to 2012, the prison population in California 
 
ing limits to efficiency-framed reforms implemented in response to mass incar-
ceration); Gruber et al., supra note 109, at 1393–95 (critiquing sex trafficking 
courts as part of a problematic trend toward “penal welfarism”). 
 118. Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 5). 
 119. Zimring makes the case that incarceration should be measured by re-
ductions in both prisons and jails. Id. Currently, most critics discuss the United 
States prison population while minimalizing or disregarding its significant jail 
population. Id.; see also FAROLE & CISSNER, supra note 24, at 1 (noting how 
drug courts rely on jails to reduce incarceration time).  
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declined but the jail population increased.120 In the year after 
Proposition 47 was implemented, the state’s prison population 
decreased by almost four percent while the statewide jail popu-
lation decreased by almost twelve percent.121 Realignment alone 
may not have been enough, and drug reform alone may not have 
had its expansive effect without the structural transformation. 
Evidence from other states bears this out as well. For exam-
ple, North Carolina is a state that suffers high rates of technical 
violations of parole like California.122 It similarly implemented a 
“realignment” reform to reduce technical violators returning to 
prison.123 That reform did not adhere to the categorical impera-
tive set up by Zimring—the state allowed counties to “opt in” to 
a structure where misdemeanor offenders became the responsi-
bility of local counties rather than the state corrections depart-
ment.124 Counties were, in essence, offering up extra jail space 
for the state corrections department to send prisoners in return 
for money.125 Though half the state’s counties were participating 
by 2014,126 that state-level reform did not result in significant 
reductions in sentences to incarceration more broadly.127 Other 
 
 120. See Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6).  
 121. Cindy Chang et al., Unintended Consequences of Proposition 47 Pose 
Challenge for Criminal Justice System, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www 
.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-prop47-anniversary-20151106-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/KU73-HKFD].  
 122. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 43, at 103–04 (discussing a 2011 Pew re-
port detailing a state-by-state study of recidivism). 
 123. See H.B. 642, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011); Statewide Mis-
demeanant Confinement Program, N.C. SHERIFF’S ASS’N, https://ncsheriffs.org/ 
services/statewide-misdemeanant-confinement-program [https://perma.cc/ 
9DBU-VD54]. Notably, the North Carolina Sheriff ’s Association, a conglomer-
ate of local government officials, managed this reform. Statewide Misdemeanant 
Confinement Program, supra. Zimring’s categorical imperative requires state-
level discretion. Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6). 
 124. See supra note 123. 
 125. See Tia Nanjappan, The Profit Motive Behind Overcrowded NC Jails, 
CHARLOTTE POST (Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.thecharlottepost.com/news/2018/ 
01/24/local-state/the-profit-motive-behind-overcrowded-nc-8200-jails/ [https:// 
perma.cc/LL7E-N7JQ] (discussing money incentives being offered to rural and 
small counties).  
 126. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE REINVEST-
MENT IN NORTH CAROLINA: THREE YEARS LATER (2014), https:// 
csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/JRinNCThreeYearsLater.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KL32-TE9B] (noting how reforms had been implemented by 
half of counties). 
 127. PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, ERA OF MASS EXPANSION: WHY STATE OFFI-
CIALS SHOULD FIGHT JAIL GROWTH (2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
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states tried their hands at modestly reclassifying low-level drug 
offenses like California. In South Carolina, for example, the leg-
islature reclassified several offenses as “violent” even as it re-
duced prison eligibility for drug possession offenses.128 In Texas, 
legislation encouraged treatment in communities rather than 
long prison terms for select offenders.129 The reform had the 
long-term effect of increasing carceral supervision and at best 
stabilizing the state’s incarcerated population.130 These experi-
ences suggest that perhaps states need both categorical removal 
of prison eligibility and financial realignment if they choose to 
pursue the categorical imperative as a route to decarcerate. But 
even if states choose a different route, the possibility of mean-
ingful decarceration may lie at the intersection of seemingly in-
dependent criminal justice reforms rather than singular agen-
das. 
Second, beware the consolidation of power. Zimring’s book 
urges the accumulation of discretion at the state level to avoid 
resistance to decarceration at the local level.131 Yet Zimring may 
be underestimating the federal government’s outsized role at the 
national level and the role of non-criminal justice actors at the 
local level in shaping any decarceral agenda. For example, Zim-
ring defends his use of national statistics to analyze a decarceral 
agenda, but he avoids examining the role of national initiatives 
to shape state reform agendas.132 For example, the Justice Rein-
vestment Initiative (JRI) is a joint public-private coalition that 
enters states to study their criminal justice system and provide 
state-level policymakers with ways to reduce prison populations 
while maintaining public safety.133 Though JRI reforms are tar-
geted at the state level first and foremost, it receives significant 
 
reports/jailsovertime.html [https://perma.cc/Z4EX-DQWT] (demonstrating a 
graphical overview of incarceration trends in North Carolina).  
 128. Eaglin, supra note 19, at 631–32.  
 129. Eaglin, supra note 24, at 206 (“[Texas reforms] included assigning non-
violent offenders to mental health and drug treatment programs instead of 
prison, placing those serving less than two years in short term jails, and engag-
ing in early prevention . . . .”).  
 130. For further explanation, see McLeod, supra note 24, at 666–76 (critiqu-
ing criminal justice reforms in Texas as part of an “anti-tax, antiregulatory re-
form agenda” that neither reduced incarceration nor facilitated decarceration). 
 131. See generally Zimring, supra note 1. 
 132. Id. (manuscript ch. 2). 
 133. See Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Cor-
rections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 539 (2015) (providing an overview of the 
JRI).  
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funding from the federal government to assist states in shaping 
their reform agenda.134 Similarly, the federal government heav-
ily subsidizes drug courts, and that funding is accompanied by 
conditions that shape the structure of drug courts in a state.135 
So, to the extent that states are funding active criminal justice 
reforms that appear to further a decarceral agenda, most are 
drawing from the pot of money incentivized by the federal gov-
ernment. That those reforms are inherently cautious has been 
critiqued.136 Here, I want to highlight the overlap with the 
buildup of the carceral state. Every state increased incarcera-
tion, but the course was sustained by the federal government’s 
incentives as well.137 If states are going to decarcerate, then law 
and policymakers need to grapple not only with state policy, but 
 
 134. See Eaglin, supra note 19, at 609–10 (highlighting types of funding 
granted by the federal government for JRI).  
 135. See id. at 619; Miller, supra note 32, at 1488–1503 (providing an over-
view on drug court infrastructure).  
 136. See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 43, at 100 (“[Justice reinvestment] 
may be thwarting the emergence of a broad-based political movement with 
power, resources, wherewithal, and vision to mount a sustained attack on the 
carceral state that will result in sizable reductions in the prison population and 
its retrenchment in other areas.”); see also Eaglin, supra note 19, at 597 (noting 
that the “drug court paradigm” has “surface appeal” but “may actually perpet-
uate overreliance on incarceration in the status quo and exacerbate flaws in the 
criminal justice system”).  
 137. See, e.g., ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR 
ON CRIME 134–79 (2016) (discussing financial incentives to expand the carceral 
arm of the state in the 1960s, largely through federal initiatives); see also Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 12102 (2018)) (authorizing 
“grants to individual States and to States organized as multi-State compacts to 
construct, develop, expand, modify, operate, or improve correctional facilities”); 
Susan Turner et al., The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes Leg-
islation: Prison Populations, State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 75, 78 (1999) (“To alleviate some of the pressure placed upon state 
budgets due to the increased incarceration of violent offenders, states have re-
ceived funding from the federal government for construction—‘bricks and mor-
tar’—of prison cells.”); Lauren-Brooke Eisen, The 1994 Crime Bill and Beyond: 
How Federal Funding Shapes the Criminal Justice System, BRENNAN CTR. 
(Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/1994 
-crime-bill-and-beyond-how-federal-funding-shapes-criminal-justice [https:// 
perma.cc/G7TJ-KE66] (“[T]hese series of grants reflect the federal government’s 
role in spurring states towards more punitive criminal justice measures. The 
funding encouraged states and cities to increase arrests, prosecutions, and in-
carceration, playing a tremendously powerful part in growing the size and scope 
of our correctional system.”).  
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with national agendas. In that sense, the accumulation of discre-
tion at the state level is fraught because it, too, may be shaped 
by often-invisible commands at the national level.  
At the same time, more thought should be dedicated to the 
role of local non-criminal administrators (aka the public) in 
shaping a decarceral agenda as well. California’s significant re-
forms generated from two directions. First, the federal courts 
produced external pressures on the state from litigation-related 
court orders to reduce the prison population.138 Second, the pub-
lic created direct pressure through popular ballot initiatives ad-
vanced by national and local policymakers in conjunction with 
community activists.139 Zimring’s proscription largely carves the 
public out of the decarceral equation. In so doing, his interven-
tion backdoors its way into a larger debate about expertise and 
the role of lay people in dismantling the phenomenon of mass 
incarceration.140 Yet meaningful distinctions exist between pe-
nal populism on the one hand and bottom-up criminal justice re-
forms on the other. Sensitivity to this ongoing intellectual and 
practical debate is critical to developing a decarceral agenda go-
ing forward. 
Finally, beware of simplification. Zimring’s pragmatic re-
form agenda at best would bring the United States from a point 
of crisis to what he describes as “mass incarceration light.”141 
What does it mean to be satisfied with an incarcerated popula-
tion that stabilizes at a rate far larger than that of the 1970s? 
Zimring suggests it means changing the focus of reform going 
forward to understand how to make a society with high rates of 
incarceration more bearable.142 This means, for example, shift-
ing reform efforts toward collateral consequences of incarcera-
tion.143 That is one route. Another route, I might suggest, is to 
think about what mass incarceration means more broadly. Mass 
 
 138. Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 5). 
 139. Id. (manuscript ch. 6). 
 140. Compare Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through 
Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2017) (advocating 
for “adversarial, contestatory forms of [lay] participation and resistance” in 
criminal justice to “build power and push for transformation”), with RACHEL E. 
BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERA-
TION 165–86 (2019) (urging expansion in the role of experts to shape criminal 
justice and punishment).  
 141. Zimring, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 5). 
 142. Id. (manuscript ch. 10). 
 143. See id. 
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incarceration refers to more than our excessive reliance on in-
carceration; it also describes a transformation in conceptions of 
legitimate government support and intervention that sustain 
this phenomenon. If we cannot expand the question beyond just 
how to reduce incarceration to deeper questions of punishment 
and society, then perhaps we should be satisfied with a world 
where criminal justice reforms are driven by cost savings and 
maintenance. But for those that feel a deep sense of unease with 
that conclusion, perhaps it is time to start engaging with puni-
tive policies from a sociohistorical rather than simply an empir-
ical framework.144 Zimring’s book takes a significant step in that 
direction by using empirical criminology and history in tandem 
to construct a decarceral agenda. His conclusions only demon-
strate the need for more humanist methodologies when discuss-
ing mass incarceration as an ideology going forward.  
 
 
 144. See Eaglin, supra note 86, at 537–38 (noting shortcomings in adopting 
technical reforms to address the sociohistorical phenomenon of mass incarcera-
tion (citing Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 
117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 268–71 (2018))); see also Amna Akbar, Toward a Radical 
Imagination of Law, 93 NYU L. REV. 405, 465–70 (2019) (critiquing police re-
forms that undercut the larger debate surrounding punishment and society).  
